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The Moderating Effect of Judge’s
Instructions on Victim Impact Testimony
in Capital Cases
Judith Platania
Garrett L. Berman
Roger Williams University

In this study, we addressed whether victim impact instructions served as a legal
safeguard in a capital case involving victim impact testimony. We hypothesized that
specific victim impact instructions would moderate the relation between victim impact
testimony and death penalty recommendations. One hundred sixty-six participants
viewed a simulated videotaped trial in which a victim impact statement was delivered in
different emotional conditions. Judge’s instructions were varied as either general
instructions or with the addition of specific victim impact instructions. Participant-jurors
who heard specific victim impact instructions were less likely to recommend death
compared to participants who heard general jury instructions. The value of victim impact
instructions as a legal safeguard in capital trials is discussed.

The victims’ rights movement has gained tremendous
momentum in recent years (Henderson, 1985). The force behind
the movement was the contention that the criminal justice system
was insensitive to the harm victims experienced. Traditionally,
victims have been denied a formal role in the judicial process.
Supporters of the movement insisted that the law provide victims a
meaningful role in criminal proceedings. As a result, statutes were
passed that allowed victims a greater degree of participation in the
justice process.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Judith Platania,
Roger Williams University, One Old Ferry Road, Bristol, RI 02809, email:
jplatania@rwu.edu .
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The Victim and Witness Protection Act (1982) enacted by
Congress, requires the inclusion of victim impact statements as
part of the pre-sentence report submitted to the sentencing
authority. The Uniform Victims of Crime Act (1992) provides
victims with a Constitutional right to be present at court
proceedings.
In general, victim impact statement legislation
permits family members of the victim the right to inform the
sentencer of the crime’s impact on their lives. This type of
evidence can include oral or written statements addressing personal
characteristics of the victim as well as the emotional and financial
impact of the victim’s death on the family.
The constitutionality of victim impact evidence has been
consistently called into question. Supporters feel that participation
in court proceedings helps victims reclaim a sense of dignity
(Mulholland, 1995; Monzo, 1990). To them, victim impact
evidence more efficiently balances punishment with harm caused
by the crime. Opponents express concern that victim impact
evidence invites jurors to base their sentencing decisions on the
victim’s character rather than evidence or the relevant criminal
circumstances (Stevens, 2000; Phillips, 1997). Regardless of one’s
position on this issue, the emotional nature of victim impact
testimony raises a troubling question: Does the admissibility of
victim impact evidence serve the psychological needs of victims’
families or assist the jury in arriving at the most appropriate
sentence?
The Supreme Court decision that allowed the introduction
of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing hearings was
Payne v. Tennessee (1991). In Payne, the victim and her two-year
old daughter were murdered; her three-year old son survived.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the son’s grandmother
told the jury how the murders had affected him. Specifically, she
spoke of how he constantly cries for his mother and sister:
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to
understand why she doesn’t come home. And he
cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many
times during the week and asks me, Grandma do
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you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m
worried about my Lacie (p. 815).
In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that proper justice
for the victim’s son was for the jury to impose the death penalty:
The people who loved little Lacie Jo, the
grandparents who are still here. The brother who
mourns for her every single day and wants to know
where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have
anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one.
These are the things that go into why it is especially
cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that that
child will carry forever (p. 816).
In Payne, the Court overruled two prior decisions
addressing victim impact testimony (Booth v. Maryland, 1987;
South Carolina v. Gathers, 1989). The Payne Court ruled that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit admission of victim impact
evidence and related prosecutorial argument at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. The Court specifically stated that evidence
and argument relating to the victim's personal characteristics and
the impact of the victim's death on surviving family members were
legitimate means of informing the sentencer about the specific
harm caused by the defendant's actions. Further, the Court
suggested that when admission of such evidence was unfairly
prejudicial, the defendant might obtain relief under the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. Since the Payne decision, all
states allow victim impact statements taken from the victim in noncapital trials, and most states allow victim impact statements from
a victim’s family during the sentencing phase of capital trials
(Field, 1991).
The crimes committed in Payne, Gathers, and Booth shared
one commonality: each was a vicious attack against innocent,
vulnerable victims. Additionally, in each case, the surviving
family members actively sought the death penalty for the
defendant (Stevens, 2000). The victim impact statements delivered
in all three cases conveyed a heightened sense of emotionality,
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enhancing the possibility of the maximum allowable sentence
(Vital, 1994). The statements included well-articulated “good
character” comments by the surviving family members as well as
the prosecuting attorneys. The criminal culpability of each
defendant was overshadowed by the harm caused to the family by
the crime.
Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v.
Georgia (1976), the procedural method used to safeguard the
capital defendant against “arbitrary and capricious” decisions has
been judicial instructions. When deciding the sentence for a
defendant who has been found guilty, jurors in most states are
asked to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
case. Aggravating factors are any relevant circumstances,
supported by the evidence presented during the trial that makes the
harshest penalty appropriate in the judgment of the jurors.
Mitigating factors are any evidence presented regarding the
defendant's character or the circumstances of the crime, which
would cause a juror to vote for a lesser sentence. Each state has its
own laws regarding how jurors are instructed to weigh aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. In order to sentence a defendant to
death, a jury must return a unanimous decision.
While the court in Payne opened the door to victim impact
evidence, they failed to set forth any specific guidelines on how
this evidence should be used at the capital trial (Kreitzberg, 1998).
The dissenting justices were gravely concerned that a jury’s
“unguided consideration” (p. 861) of victim impact evidence
would lead to an increase in death penalty verdicts. In the absence
of specific guidelines, the Payne Court placed the burden on
individual states to decide how this evidence should be used in a
capital trial. In New Jersey, the Supreme Court placed restrictions
on the statute allowing victim impact testimony in a capital murder
trial (State v. Muhammed, 1996). Specifically, the Court ruled that
the victim impact testimony be limited to one family member, be
pre-approved by the trial court, be in written form, and not include
any opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the sentence that
should be imposed (Castellano, 1996). Results of social science
research (McGowan & Myers, 2004; see also Luginbuhl &
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Burkhead, 1995; Myers & Arbuthnot, 1999; Myers, Lynn, &
Arbuthnot, 2002) concur with the Court in Muhammed. Studies
reveal that participant-jurors are considerably influenced by
information about the suffering of the victim and the victim’s
family. In both videotaped trial simulations and transcript
summaries, death penalty recommendations increased in the
presence of victim impact evidence. In addition, Greene, Koehring,
and Quiat (1998) found individuals rendered more severe
judgments when the victim was portrayed as a highly regarded
member of the community. This result is not limited to statements
made by surviving family members or coworkers of the victim.
Participant-jurors exposed to statements made by the prosecutor
detailing the effect of the crime on the victim’s family, were
significantly more likely to vote for the death penalty compared to
those not exposed (Platania & Moran, 1999). These findings
support the argument that direct exposure to victim impact
testimony or through closing arguments can overwhelm the jury’s
ability to reach a sentencing decision based on reason. When
adhered to, the above-mentioned restrictions can minimize the risk
that sentencing decisions are the result of emotion rather than
reason. However, despite the Court’s efforts to limit the victim
impact testimony in U.S. v. McVeigh (1997), witness statements
were gripping: at times moving jurors to tears (Burr, 2003). The
magnitude of this case has raised defense attorneys’ awareness of
the unlikelihood of limiting or excluding victim impact testimony.
Some states, however, utilize cautionary instructions in
capital cases when victim impact evidence is introduced (Turner v.
State, 1997; Cargle v. State, 1995). Defense attorneys believe
detailed instructions have the potential to serve as an effective
procedural safeguard: protecting the defendant from “arbitrary and
capricious actions” on the part of the sentencer (Adams, 2003).
However, research finds that jurors lack a general understanding of
the function and application of judge’s instructions in death
penalty studies (Haney & Lynch, 1994; Luginbuhl & Howe, 1995).
In order for victim impact instructions to be an effective safeguard,
they must not be confusing to capital jurors. One example of
victim impact instructions follows:
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The prosecution has introduced what is known as
victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is
not the same as evidence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance. Introduction of victim impact
evidence does not relieve the state of its burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a
statutory aggravating circumstance. This evidence is
simply another method of informing you about the
harm caused by the crime in question. To the extent
that you find that this evidence reflects on the
defendant's culpability, you may consider it, but you
may not use it as a substitute for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance and limit the scope of the
evidence presented (Turner v. State, 1997, p. 843).
This instruction guides jurors to a clear understanding of the role
of victim impact testimony in sentencing decisions. However, the
differential impact of judicial instructions in capital trials involving
victim impact statements has not been established.
The present study addressed whether victim impact
instructions act as a legal safeguard in a capital case involving
victim impact testimony. Specifically, we examined the effect of
varying levels of emotional victim impact testimony and judge’s
instructions on sentencing recommendations. We hypothesized
that specific victim impact instructions (similar to the instructions
in Turner) would moderate the relation between victim impact
testimony and death penalty recommendations. In addition, we
predicted a moderating effect of specific instructions on
participants’ perceptions of the victim impact statement. Finally,
we examined differences in sentencing recommendations as a
function of attitudes toward the victim and defendant.
METHOD
Participants
The sample consisted of 166 participants (72 males, 94
females) who were students from general education or introductory

© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2006, 2(2)

90 MODERATING EFFECT

psychology classes attending a northeastern university.
Participants were predominantly Caucasian (97%) between the
ages of 18 to 24. Seventy-six percent considered themselves either
slightly liberal or liberal compared to 24% of the sample who rated
themselves as slightly conservative or conservative. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions.
Materials
The videotaped trial was based on an actual transcript from
the murder trial of William Anthony Brooks (Brooks v. State,
1979). The trial was approximately 40 minutes in length and
included: a summary of the guilt phase, a victim impact statement,
closing arguments by the prosecuting and defense attorneys, and
judges' instructions. The victim impact statement was taken from
the sentencing phase of the capital trial of Napoleon Beazley
(Beazley v. State, 1997). Napoleon Beazley was found guilty of the
first degree murder of John Luttig. During the sentencing phase,
Michael Luttig, the decedent’s son and an appeals court judge,
gave a victim impact statement to the jury prior to sentencing. We
edited the statement as delivered by the victim’s mother; a more
suitable fit with the Brooks case. Actors from a local theatre played
the roles of attorneys, judge, and the mother of the victim.
In the guilt phase summary, the judge stated the defendant
was convicted on charges of kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, and
first degree murder. The judge then informed participant-jurors
that they would hear testimony provided by the victim's mother
and decide which penalty was appropriate for this crime. The
mother of the victim provided the victim impact statement which
lasted approximately 8 minutes. The victim impact statement
described the effects of the crime on the victim’s mother and
family. Participants in the high emotion victim impact statement
condition witnessed the mother sobbing while reading the
statement. Participants in the low emotion victim impact condition
witnessed the mother reading the same statement in a calm, fairly
unaffected manner. Participants in the control condition viewed
each aspect of the trial minus the victim impact statement. In order
to maintain the ecological validity of our study, participants who
were not exposed to the victim impact statement did not respond to
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measures assessing various aspects of the statement (i.e.,
emotionality and importance on reaching verdict).
In his closing argument, the prosecuting attorney argued
that jurors should sentence the defendant to death. In contrast, the
defense attorney’s closing argument asked jurors for leniency and
to spare the defendant's life. Participants in the victim impact
instruction condition heard the standard judge’s instructions along
with specific victim impact instructions stating that, inter alia,
victim impact statements can never serve as the basis for making a
defendant eligible for the death penalty. The specific victim impact
instructions used in our study were prepared by a Maryland public
defender (O’Donnell, 1997) and submitted to the Court as
proposed instructions in a death penalty case. The standard judge’s
instructions were taken verbatim from the Brooks trial. See
Appendix for the specific victim impact instructions.
After viewing the videotaped simulated trial, jurors
responded to a number of demographic items including: gender,
age, ethnicity, political affiliation, and previous experience as a
juror in a criminal or civil proceeding. In addition, participants
were asked whether or not they agreed that sympathy for the
victim, victim’s family, and defendant should be taken into
consideration when deciding sentence (0 = completely disagree to
7 = completely agree). Participants were asked whether their views
of the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their
ability to follow the judge’s instructions in the case (Wainwright v.
Witt, 1985). This standard is referred to as “death qualification”
and is used to ensure that prospective jurors are able to consider
the death penalty. The primary dependent variable was sentence
recommendation for the defendant measured dichotomously (life
imprisonment vs. death by lethal injection).
Design and Procedure
Our study investigated the combined effects of emotional
victim impact testimony and judge’s instructions on capital
sentencing decisions as a 2 (Instruction type: general vs. general
and specific victim impact instructions) X 3 (Emotionality of
victim impact statement: high vs. low vs. none) between subjects
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factorial design. Participants were tested in groups ranging in size
from 10 to 28. They were instructed to read all the materials
carefully because they would be serving as participant-jurors in the
death penalty phase of a capital trial. Upon obtaining informed
consent, participants viewed the 40-minute videotape and
responded to a 45-item questionnaire assessing: demographics,
sentence recommendation, victim and defendant attitude items, and
perceptions of the victim impact statements. The entire study took
one hour.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if
participants in the high emotion condition perceived the victim
impact statement as significantly more emotional than the low
emotion condition. Results indicated the manipulation was
effective: F(1, 88) = 22.90, p = .000: (Ms = 5.58 vs. 3.23,
respectively). Ratings were made on a scale of 1 = not at all
emotional to 6 = very emotional. In addition, participants in the
specific instruction condition rated victim impact instructions as
significantly more useful (1 = not at all useful to 6 = very useful) in
understanding victim impact evidence compared to participants in
the general instruction condition: F(1, 127) = 18.75, p = .000: (Ms
= 3.86 and 2.56), demonstrating the effectiveness of the instruction
manipulation.
Witt Removals
Thirty-seven jurors (22%) indicated their views on the
death penalty would either prevent or substantially impair their
ability to consider both penalties (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985). A
chi-square test of independence revealed a significant association
between sentencing recommendation and participant-jurors
identified as Witt: χ2 (1, N = 166) = 15.41, p = .000. Twenty-four
of 37 (65%), were significantly more likely to recommend life
compared to death (n = 13, 35%). Data were removed from further
analyses for those jurors identified as Witt.
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Sentence Recommendation
A log-linear analysis revealed a significant instruction by
sentence (IV – DV) association: χ2 (1, N = 129) = 7.53, p = .006. Of
38 participant-jurors who recommended life, 25 (66%) heard both
general and specific instructions, compared to 13 (34%) who heard
general instructions. Conversely, of 91 participant-jurors who
recommended death, 55 (60%) heard general instructions, compared
to 36 (40%) who heard specific instructions. There was no significant
effect of emotionality of victim impact statement on sentence
recommendation, nor was there a significant emotion * instruction
interaction.
Participant-jurors who recommended life (n = 38), were not
significantly different from those who recommended death (n = 91)
with respect to gender, political views, and familiarity with law
enforcement. All participants reportedly took their roles as jurors
seriously (M = 5.57, on a scale of 1 = not at all serious to 6 =
completely serious).
Reliability Analysis
Participant-jurors who heard victim impact statements rated
the eight statements made by the victim’s mother during her
testimony. Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0= not at all
important in reaching my decision to 7 = completely important in
reaching my decision). As Table 1 indicates, the means on the
statements ranged from 4.97 to 5.59 for our entire sample. The
eight statements revealed inter-item correlations ranging from .30
to .83, p < .001 (one-tailed). Cronbach’s alpha indicated that the
eight statements were internally consistent, α = .91. Based on this
result, we combined the items to form the “Victim Impact
Statement Importance Scale” (VISIS). Scores on the scale were
computed across the 89 participants who heard the victim impact
statements. There was a significant difference between jurors who
recommended life vs. those who recommended death on VISIS:
t(87) = -2.57, p = .012 (Ms = 38.00 v. 44.40, respectively). Jurors
who voted for death rated the statements as significantly more
important in their decision compared to those who voted for life.
Instructions as a Moderator of VIS Importance
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To examine whether instructions moderated the relation
between emotionality and participants’ ratings of the eight
statements, we conducted a 2 (Instruction type: general vs. general
and specific victim impact instructions) X 2 (Emotionality of
victim impact statement: high vs. low) between subjects factorial
design. We found a significant instruction * emotion interaction
on VIS Importance: F(1, 85) = 4.28, p = .04; ή2 = .05. Specific
instructions significantly lessened overall importance of the
statements in the high emotion condition, compared to general
instructions. In addition, we found a significant main effect of
instruction: F(1, 85) = 7.72, p = .007. Participant-jurors in the
specific instruction condition rated the importance of statements
lower compared to participant-jurors exposed to general
instructions: (Ms = 39.21 and 45.48 for specific vs. general
instructions, respectively). Table 2 displays the interaction means
of this analysis.
A significant positive relationship was found between
overall importance of statements in death penalty recommendation
and: the amount of suffering participants felt the victim
experienced: r = .41, compassion for the victim: r = .32, and
compassion for surviving family members: r = .31. All correlations
were significant at p = .000.
Life vs. Death Attitudes
Participant-jurors recommending life reported significantly
different attitudes toward the defendant compared to those who
recommended death. Table 3 displays the differences in attitudes
toward the defendant as a function of life vs. death sentence
recommendation. More favorable attitudes toward the defendant
were reported by participant-jurors who recommended life
compared to those who recommended death. Participant-jurors
who recommended death rated six of the eight statements read by
the victim’s mother as significantly more important in reaching
their decision compared to those who recommended life. Table 4
displays these differences.
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DISCUSSION
Overall, we obtained partial support for our moderating
hypotheses. While we did not find that victim impact instructions
reduced the influence of emotion on sentence recommendation
(Baron & Kenney, 1986), we did find a moderating effect of
instruction on participants’ perceptions of the victim impact
testimony. After hearing specific instructions, participant-jurors in
the high emotion condition rated the eight statements as
significantly less important in reaching their decision, compared to
those who heard general instructions. The introduction of
instructions specifically tailored to organizing and applying this
type of evidence apparently reduced the affective significance of
victim impact statements. Additionally, exposure to specific victim
impact instructions resulted in an overall increase in life sentences,
and a decrease in death sentences. These findings provide a
baseline of empirical support for defense attorneys’ contention that
properly worded victim impact instructions can serve as an
effective safeguard in capital trials when victim impact evidence is
presented (Castellano, 1996).
Consistent with McGowan and Myers (2004), participants
in our study did not differ in sentence recommendation as a
function of level of emotion. Highly emotional statements
appeared to have the same affect on sentence recommendation as
less emotional statements. The victim impact evidence in the
present study was based on an actual statement written and
presented by a federal appeals court judge whose father was
murdered in a carjacking (Beazley v. State, 1997). As a result, the
victim impact statement was powerful, articulate, and persuasive.
Given the magnitude of the victim impact evidence in the present
study, we may have unknowingly mirrored Justice Powell’s
concerns when writing for the majority in Booth. Specifically,
Justice Powell stated that admitting victim impact evidence in a
capital sentencing hearing “creates a constitutionally unacceptable
risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capricious manner” (p. 2536). In our study, the strength and
articulation of the statement may have overshadowed any
distinguishable differences in level of emotion when determining
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sentence. The type of statement chosen for our study may also
explain why we did not find a moderating effect of victim impact
instructions on verdict. Perhaps instructions are most effective
when limits are placed on the type and manner in which victim
impact evidence is presented in capital sentencing hearings (Burr,
2003; Myers & Greene, 2004).
It is important to point out that the magnitude of
participant-jurors’ responses to various victim issues in this type of
research study can be exaggerated due to the limited amount of
trial information made available to them. This type of problem is
not atypical in laboratory research simulating complex trial
procedures. In our study, we attempted to minimize this problem
by using a number of ecologically valid materials including: a
victim impact statement, closing arguments, and judge’s
instructions taken from actual cases. In addition, we utilized
videotaped stimuli, which are accepted as the standard for realistic
trial simulations compared to written transcripts and audio
presentation. Although we are confident that our approach to
examining this topic drew on the strengths of both internal and
external validity, we echo other researchers’ concerns regarding
generalizing results involving life and death decisions (Myers &
Greene, 2004). The value of this study is the insight offered into
the use of instructions as a procedural safeguard in minimizing the
effect of emotionality in capital trials.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine victim
impact instructions as a procedural safeguard in capital sentencing
decisions. Since the Payne decision, procedural safeguards in
cases involving victim impact testimony have generally been in the
form of restrictions; i.e., the type of allowable witnesses providing
testimony (Wesley v. State, 1996), the form of the testimony (U.S.
v. McVeigh, 1997), or the amount of time allowed to deliver a
victim impact statement (State v. Biechele, 2005). There is little
empirical evidence that these types of safeguards remove the
possibility that victim impact statements are unduly prejudicial
(Greene, 1999; Greene, et al., 1998). The decision-making process
in a capital trial should be guided by a reasoned assessment of the
magnitude of the defendant’s actions. Victim impact testimony
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makes this assessment much more difficult to achieve. Victim
impact instructions have the potential to minimize the risk to
decision-making caused by emotional victim impact testimony.
Future studies are needed to address the differential effects of the
various safeguards imposed in cases involving victim impact
evidence.
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APPENDIX
Victim Impact Instructions
During the course of this proceeding, you have heard
evidence which pertains to the personal characteristics of the
victim, and you have heard evidence which pertains to the impact
of the victim’s death on her family and community. This evidence
is referred to as victim impact evidence and is intended to show
each victim’s uniqueness as a human being and the impact of her
loss upon her family. This evidence should be given whatever
weight you feel it deserves, in accordance with the law and
pursuant to my instructions, in determining whether to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment or death. I instruct you, however,
that victim impact evidence can never serve as the basis for
making a defendant eligible for the death penalty. This evidence is
not to be considered by you as an aggravating circumstance - as a
reason to impose the death penalty. No matter how emotionally
compelling you have found this evidence to be, you are instructed
that you may not consider evidence concerning the personal
characteristics or impact of the victim’s death on her family or
community during the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. When weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances you may only consider those aggravating
circumstances, if any, which you have unanimously found proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and those mitigating circumstances, if
any, which you have found proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. During this process, you may not consider any evidence
which pertains to the personal characteristics or the impact of the
victim’s death on her family or community. If you determine
during the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, then you will enter a sentence of life imprisonment.
It is only in accordance with these instructions that you may
consider victim impact evidence in your determination of the
appropriate sentence in this case.
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Table 1
Mean Importance of Eight Victim Impact Statements Read by Victim’s Mother
(N=89).

Statement

Overall Mean_

“…watching the re-enactment of her murder on television.”
“…wondering what those final moments must have been like.”
“…living with the horror, agony, despair, emptiness, confusion.”
“…hearing your daughter’s body has just been found.”
“…hearing the autopsy report of this grotesque crime.”
“…living the rest of your life with these horrible facts.”
“…a strange man in your driveway with a gun.”
“…hearing your daughter has been gunned down.”

4.97
5.26
5.14
5.26
5.51
5.38
5.59
5.35

______________________________________________________
Note: Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0= not at all important in reaching
my decision to 7 = completely important in reaching my decision).
Each statement was prefaced with the word: “Imagine….”
Table 2
Mean VIS Importance Score by Emotion and Instruction (N=89).
Emotionality
Instructions
High
Low
General
48.68
42.27
General + Specific
37.75
40.67
_____________________________________________________
Note. Higher scores indicated greater importance placed on the eight statements
in reaching their decision. Maximum Importance Score = 56.00. Range = 54.00,
Mean = 42.53, Median = 44.00.
Table 3
Attitude Differences as a Function of Sentence Recommendation
___________________________________________________________
Sentence recommendation
Lifea
Deathb
Attitude item
___________________________________________________________
I feel sympathy for the defendant.
3.53
2.19
I feel the defendant is dangerous.
4.94
5.83
I feel the defendant could be rehabilitated. 3.00
1.58
I favored the defense closing argument.*
4.58
3.91
___________________________________________________________
Note. Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0=completely agree to 7 =
completely disagree).
a
n = 38. bn = 91.
*p < .05. The three remaining mean differences significant at p < .01.
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Table 4
Importance of Statements as a Function of Sentence Recommendation (N=89).
Sentence recommendation
Lifea

Deathb

Statement
“. . . living with the horror, agony, despair….”*
4.48
5.41
“. . . hearing your daughter’s body has just
4.29
5.67
been found.”**
“. . . hearing your daughter has been gunned down.”* 4.81
5.58
“. . . seeing the re-enactment of the murder on TV.”** 4.14
5.33
“. . . what the final moments must have been like.”** 4.59
5.54
“. . . hearing the autopsy report.”*
5.00
5.73
_______________________________________________________________
Note. an = 27. bn = 62.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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